With the rapid growth of the Internet-of-Things (IoT), security issues for the IoT are becoming increasingly serious. Memory leaks are a common and harmful software defect for IoT programs running on resource-limited devices. Static analysis is an effective method for memory leak detection, however, because the existing methods cannot fully describe the memory state of IoT programs at run time, false positives and false negatives frequently occur. To improve the precision of memory leak detection, we propose an abstract memory model SeqMM to describe sequential storage structures. SeqMM differs from other abstract memory models in its ability to handle both points-to analysis and numerical analysis of pointers, which contributes to eliminating false positives in defect detection. In addition, based on the analysis of the sequential storage structure, we introduce the analysis of its operations in C programs, including transfer operations and predicate operations. Moreover, we present a memory leak detection algorithm by determining the state of the program points related to allocated memory blocks. The experimental results of five real projects indicate that the false positive rates of DTSC_SeqMM, Klocwork12 and DTSC_RSTVL are 29.0%, 15.0% and 40.6% respectively, and the corresponding false negative rates are 0%, 22.7% and 13.6%.
As the basic infrastructure of the information society, the IoT has been applied in many fields, such as medical monitoring, intelligent transportation, and environmental monitoring. With the expansion of the application scope of the IoT, increasing attention has been paid to its security issues. Embedded software systems running on the IoT are usually developed in C language. Due to the lag of security standards and the lack of security awareness and investment of software developers, embedded software systems have unsafe memory management, leading to the risk of memory leaks in C programs. IoT programs often run for a long time on devices with limited computing and storage capacity. Once an IoT program experiences a memory leak, the memory resources may be exhausted, leading to the failure of normal operations or even paralysis of the entire IoT system.
Memory leaks are mainly the result of allocated memory blocks not being fully released. Figure 1 shows a snippet in The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Honghao Gao . an open-source project that has a memory leak at line 478. texImage->Data points to a dynamically allocated memory block at line 385. If the value of texImage->Format does not match any that is listed at the switch statement at line 451, the function will directly return without releasing the memory block allocated previously at line 478, leading to a memory leak.
Static analysis is an effective strategy for detecting memory leaks in programs, usually through data flow analysis, which analyzes the propagation of program state information in control flow graphs. By means of data flow analysis, we can easily calculate the size of the memory block allocated in a program, and determine which pointer points to the memory block via points-to analysis and whether the offset occurred and to what extent, providing a basis for accurate memory leak detection. Dynamically allocated memory blocks and arrays can be called sequential storage structures. Sequential storage structures cannot be accurately analyzed by traditional data flow analysis methods, which leads to false positives and false negatives in memory leak detection.
Three main difficulties complicate the analysis of sequential storage structures. First, the structural complexity makes traditional data flow analysis inaccurate; second, traditional data flow analysis methods do not model sequential storage structures for trade-offs of accuracy and efficiency; finally, when pointers are used to access the sequential storage structures in C programs, existing data flow analysis methods basically pay attention to only points-to information and do not consider the numerical properties offset, that is, the distance from the base address to the current address of contiguous memory blocks.
To illustrate the analysis and memory leak detection of sequential storage structures in this paper, we first define the sequential storage structure.
Definition 1: Sequential storage structure. A sequential storage structure is a structure in which a group of storage units with consecutive addresses store data successively.
A sequential storage structure is shown in Figure 2 , where m1 is a chunk of physical memory, a rectangle indicates a memory block, and the rectangle marked by slashes is an array or contiguous memory block allocated dynamically by malloc. m2 is a detailed description of the internal structure of the memory block marked with slashes at m1, where each small rectangular block represents one byte. We assume that this contiguous memory block has stored some integer data, and integer data occupies the memory size shown by the slashes in m2. m3 is the sequential storage structure defined in this paper, and the memory size of storing one piece of data is recorded as a unit, numbered sequentially starting from 0 according to the relative position of each unit to the initial unit. Therefore, the offset in this paper is the number of units between a memory unit and the initial unit.
Based on the study of static analysis methods and memory leak detection for sequential storage structures, this paper makes the following contributions:
(1) An abstract memory model for describing sequential storage structures(SeqMM): SeqMM is proposed to describe the abstract state of all types of variables and FIGURE 2. The sequential storage structure studied in this paper. m1 is a chunk of physical memory, m2 is a detailed description of the internal structure of the memory blocks labeled by slashes at m1, and m3 is the sequential storage structure defined in this paper. their relationships, specifically supporting the analysis of the sequential storage structures and their elements.
(2) Data flow analysis supporting sequential storage structure:
A data flow analysis method for C programs based on SeqMM, which is flow-sensitive, context-sensitive and fieldsensitive, is realized. This method supports sequential storage structure analysis, including pointer-related transfer operations, predicate operations and the mapping of parameters and arguments when pointers access sequential storage structures.
(3) Memory leak detection algorithm: Based on the above analysis, an algorithm to detect memory leaks is implemented in a defect detecting tool(DTSC), and five open-source projects are used to evaluate its effectiveness.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss several related works on abstract memory models, data flow analysis and memory leak detection. In Section III, we define a simple C language and the proposed abstract memory model SeqMM. In Section IV, we discuss pointer-related operations. Next, in Section V, a memory leak detection algorithm is described. In Section VI, empirical evaluations on five open-source projects are presented to demonstrate the performance of the proposed model and algorithm. Finally, in Section VII, we present the conclusion and discussion of this paper.
II. RELATED WORK A. ABSTRACT MEMORY MODEL
Static analysis needs to use the memory model to represent the storage state of programs, and the memory model must effectively represent the information of memory units. At present, based on different trade-offs of accuracy, efficiency and application, researchers have proposed a variety of models that describe the storage information of programs.
The most basic memory model is the name-value pairs [1] . When an assignment expression is evaluated, this model binds the name of the left-end variable to the value of the right-end expression. Zhang et al. [2] proposed an array model in which the memory can be intuitively seen as a large array. In this model, the index of an array element indicates the memory address of a variable. The above methods are simple and intuitive but do not involve a description of complex data structures such as pointers and structures. To this end, [3] and [4] introduced a region to manage memory. [3] decomposed whole shape abstraction into smaller configures from the horizontal and vertical directions and analyzed them separately. This model has been applied to memory leak detection, but does not involve data flow analysis. Xu et al. [4] introduced a region-based ternary model based on regional hierarchy, which plays a crucial role in precisely simulating the C semantics. Meanwhile, in previous work, we proposed a sound abstract memory model region-based symbolic three-valued logic(RSTVL) [5] , which can describe the morphological information of data structures in memory and the storage state of the memory objects of C programs.
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Most of the above research cannot describe sequential storage structures, and none can handle offset information.
Yin et al. [6] proposed an abstract memory model based on the points-to relationship and offset and designed an abstract domain that can describe points-to relationships and offset information. However, a large interval was used to represent the deviation range when depicting the pointer offset, which led to errors in the analysis of the pointer offset.
B. DATA FLOW ANALYSIS
Researchers usually adopt sensitive analysis, including flow sensitivity, context sensitivity, field sensitivity and path sensitivity, to improve the accuracy of data flow analysis.
Flow-sensitive analysis [7] - [10] considers the order in which statements are executed. Traditional data flow analysis is flow-sensitive, whereas flow-insensitive analysis appears mainly in points-to analysis [11] , [12] . Context-sensitive analysis [13] - [16] considers the context information of the function call sites. Context-sensitive inter-procedural analysis produces different analysis results based on the data flow values at different call sites of the same function, whereas context-insensitive inter-procedural analysis produces a unique approximate result. The former analysis result is more accurate than the latter. Field-sensitive analysis [17] - [19] ensures the accuracy of the analysis of complex variables by considering the relationships among complex data types such as structures and their members. Path-sensitive analysis [20] - [23] adds consideration of path conditions in the code. However, for large-scale or complex programs, path-sensitive analysis is usually inefficient due to path expansion. Sensitive analysis can be used to improve the accuracy of data flow analysis, but increases the cost of the analysis and decreases the efficiency.
In this paper, we propose flow-sensitive, context-sensitive and field-sensitive data flow analysis that supports sequential storage structure to balance accuracy and efficiency.
C. MEMORY LEAK DETECTION
Memory leaks exist in many areas, such as IoT [24] , mobile computing [25] , [26] and blockchain [27] , and can seriously degrade software performance in these environments and even cause software to crash at runtime. The allocation and release of memory blocks are artificially controlled. With the increasing size and complexity of computer programs, human negligence can easily lead to memory leaks. In recent years, researchers have conducted substantial research on memory leak detection by means of static analysis and dynamic detection.
Dynamic detection methods [28] , [29] execute the program and track the allocation, use and release of memory blocks as the program runs. The method recently proposed in [30] dynamically detect memory leaks such that relevant information about each allocated memory block is updated as the program is running. This information is passed to the back-end leak checker to monitor each memory block. If a memory block is not pointed to by any pointer, the checker will record the leaked location in the program and release the leaked memory block. Although dynamic detection can reach a definitive conclusion for each program execution, it relies on test cases, so it cannot determine the state in unreachable paths.
Static analysis is used to analyze a program and detect defects without actual program execution. Zhu et al. [31] proposed an intelligent detection method for memory leaks of C programs, that extracts memory leak characteristics based on static analysis and uses a machine learning model to detect memory leaks. However, the project scale involved in this method is small, and its effectiveness has been demonstrated in large-scale programs. At present, there are some mature static analysis tools, such as Klockwork [32] , DTSC [33] and Fortify [34] , that are widely used. Static analysis is able to detect memory leaks on all paths, which improves the accuracy of detection, but also greatly reduces the efficiency.
In addition, researchers are beginning to understand the nature of leakage-related problems, such as their type distribution, how they are discovered, and which defects are causing them, which is a prerequisite for designing better ways to avoid, diagnose, and fix leaks. Ghanavati et al. [35] provided preliminary results on the leak types, detection types, and root causes of leak-inducing defects by studying 452 issues found in repositories of 10 mature Apache Java projects.
In this paper, we use static analysis to model the sequential storage structure that may cause memory leaks, and to effectively analyze the various operations involved, especially considering pointer points-to relationships and offsets. Based on the results of the static analysis, we proposed a memory leak detection method and verified it on five open-source projects.
III. ABSTRACT MEMORY MODEL USED FOR SEQUENTIAL STORAGE STRUCTURE A. A SIMPLE LANGUAGE
An address in memory may be recorded by a pointer during a program execution, and a certain type of data is stored [6] . By analyzing the source code, the pointer in C language can be assigned the address of a variable, the array, the address of an array element or null.
Definition 2: Address Expression. The pointer, address taking addressable expression, and array can be added and subtracted via integer expression and are collectively referred to as address expression.
To formalize the description of the model and data flow analysis for C programs in IoT, we use the simple language shown in Figure 3 . The language is a typeless C-like imperative language with procedures, dynamic allocation, addressable expression, and address expression. A program prog maps each procedure to a pair containing formal parameters V and body S. Figure 3 shows the composition of the address expression addrexp. pointer is a pointer pointing to a memory block, &aexp means obtaining the address of the addressable expression [5] aexp, and array is an array.
For instance, consider the program snippet in Figure 4 : pointer ptr, buf , line and more, array x.result, complex expressions &buf [x.data + 2], ++line, more-x.data + 4 are all address expressions.
B. SEQMM
We propose an abstract memory model called SeqMM to effectively describe the sequential storage structure of C programs.
Consider the program snippet in Figure 4 . The base address and offset of the variables are shown in Table 1 . For instance, the pointer line at line 12 points to buf [x.data + 2] and deviates the base address buf x.data + 2 units, where buf is the initial address of the sequential storage structure after successful dynamic allocation via malloc. We have proposed a sound abstract memory model RSTVL [5] that can describe points-to relationships, hierarchical relationships, linear and logic relationships among memory addressable expressions but does not support the description of the pointer offset, leading to inadequate detection for defects related to sequential storage structures, such as memory leak, out-of-bounds and buffer overflow defects. An improved abstract memory model SeqMM is proposed based on the extension of RSTVL to effectively describe the sequential storage structure and pointer-related operations.
Definition 3: SeqMM. SeqMM is a model of the quadruple <Var, Region, S Exp , Domain>, where Var is a memory object [5] , Region is abstract memory, S Exp is a symbolic expression [5] , and Domain is the domain of values.
SeqMM uses regions to represent memory blocks allocated to memory objects abstractly and maps addressable expressions access to regions access. We call the dataflow information described by SeqMM as the abstract store. Each region is identified by a unique region number and corresponds to the l-value of a memory block, and a symbolic expression represents the r-value of the memory block.
For different types of memory objects Var, SeqMM abstractly describes the storage state with different types of regions. PrimitiveRegion describes primitive type memory objects, PointerRegion describes pointers, ArrayRegion describes arrays, and StructRegion describes structs. Each region has a unique number, and the numbers of the above regions are bm_i, pm_i, am_i and sm_i(i ∈ N ). For the region of dynamically allocated memory, the number is mxm_i_n(x denotes the type of region, the value is ''b'', ''p'', ''a'' or ''s''. n is the number of bytes of nameless memory block). In addition, the number of null address is ''null'', the number of wild address is ''wild'', and for the function parameters and global variables, the region numbers are incremented by ''u'' and ''g'', respectively.
Consider a variable p in a C program. The SeqMM model will differ depending on the type of p.
• p is a primitive type variable: If the value of p is unknown, the SeqMM model is expressed as a quadruple <Var, Region, S Exp , Domain>, and Domain is [-inf,inf]; otherwise, the SeqMM model is expressed as a triple <Var, Region, S Exp >, and S Exp is the value of p.
• p is an array: The SeqMM model is expressed as a triple <Var, Region, Domain>, and each r i ∈ Domain consists of an index of an array element and its region.
• p is a struct: The SeqMM model is expressed as a triple <Var, Region, Domain>, and each r i ∈Domain consists of a member of struct p and its region.
• p is a pointer: p can be expressed as <Var, Region, S Exp , Domain>, where Domain is a collection of points-to regions and corresponding offsets for p. For each d i ∈Domain, the result can be expressed as a tuple <PtRegion, Offset>, where PtRegion is the region of the memory object p and Offset is an integer expression, indicating the integer interval corresponding to the offset from the base address.
We illustrate SeqMM by analyzing the different types of variables in Figure 4 . At line 6, the SeqMM model of struct x is expressed as <x, usm_0, {}>. Since the two members of x, result and data, have not been used thus far, the Domain of x is empty. The model of i at line 7 is expressed as <i, bm_1, i_01,
is used to identify the unknown value interval of a primitive type variable within a function. value is expressed as <value, bm_2, 1>, where ''1'' is the symbolic expression for value. At line 8, pointer fmt is pointing to i, and its model is expressed as <fmt, pm_3, fmt_45, {<bm_1, [0, 0]>}>, where the offset interval is fixed as [0,0] when the pointer points to a primitive type variable. Then, the points-to relationship of ptr cannot be determined, so its model is expressed as <ptr, pm_7, ptr_1011, {<wild, [0, 0]>}>, where the number of the wild address is ''wild'' and the initial offset interval is [0,0]. Similarly, we can easily find the SeqMM representation of buf , line, more. When line 10 is completed, x.data can be expressed as <x.data, ubm_11, 3.0>, and x is updated to <x, usm_0, {<data, ubm_11>}>. For the dynamically allocated memory block at line 11, our method first generates a unique region number, ''mbm_12_8'' and ''bm_13'', for the entire nameless memory block and the first unit of it, where ''12'' is the number of bytes of nameless memory block. For convenience, we change the points-to relationship of the pointer pointing to the whole memory block to the first unit of the memory block. Therefore, buf can be expressed as <buf , pm_8, buf _1819, {<bm_13, [0, 0]>}>. Furthermore, for the program point after line 13 in Figure 4 , the abstract storage state about memory block allocated at line 11 and related pointers described by SeqMM is shown in Figure 5 . Our work on how to analyze the points-to relationships of pointers is described in detail in the next section.
IV. DATA FLOW ANALYSIS FOR SEQUENTIAL STORAGE STRUCTURE
We have realized a flow-sensitive, context-sensitive and field-sensitive data flow analysis for C programs based on RSTVL. The analysis begins at the entry point of a C function, the abstract state of each active variable at each program point is calculated based on a statement transfer relationship, and analyzes function calls based on symbolic function summaries [5] . To improve the accuracy of the sequential storage structure analysis, we use SeqMM to improve the data flow analysis, including transfer operations for pointer arithmetic and pointer dereference, predicate operations and the mapping of parameters and arguments.
A. POINTER-RELATED TRANSFER OPERATION
In C programs, pointers realize the assignment of other variables through pointer dereference and pointer arithmetic. The following section discusses the two types of assignment in detail.
First, let l be a program point in a C program, and let 
1) TRANSFER OPERATIONS FOR POINTER ARITHMETIC
According to the syntax feature of C programs, pointer arithmetic operations can be unified down to the address expression operations, which have a variety of forms in C programs. These varieties can be classified into the following categories(iexp is an integer expression, and p is a pointer):
//A is an array • p + +; • + + p; //similar to operation p + +, it is not discussed separately • p − −; • − − p; //similar to operation p − −, it is not discussed separately Based on the above common pointer arithmetic operations, this paper summarizes the following transfer operations for the assignment of pointers, as shown in Table 2 . newS Exp represents the newly generated symbolic expression, and nR is a new region deviating a certain length from r. Out-of -Bounds means the index is out of bounds.
Consider p = q + iexp. For each region r pointed to by q, if it is an ArrayRegion, do the following:
• The transfer is performed by obtaining the offset of region r such that O l [[r]] + iexp is between 0 and the length of the initial region; otherwise, the Out-of -Bounds warning is prompted.
• During the transfer operations, a new region nR, which deviates iexp units from r, is generated, and a new symbol expression corresponding to nR is created.
As shown in Table 2 , when regions pointed to by the left-end pointer are updated, the offset interval, base address region and symbolic expression of these regions will also be updated accordingly.
Our work on the partial transfer operations in Figure 4 is shown in Table 3 . If the if condition is satisfied, line will point to buf [9] when the program executes line 15, but the result is beyond the bounds of the contiguous memory index, prompting the Out-of -Bounds warning.
2) TRANSFER OPERATIONS FOR POINTER DEREFERENCE
A pointer can be used to access the values of elements in a sequential storage structure flexibly via pointer dereference. If p is a pointer, its dereference operations can be summarized as follows:
• a = * p; • a = p[iexp]; // iexp is an integer expression. Based on the two pointer dereference operations, the corresponding transfer operations are summarized in Table 4 . For a = * p, according to the symbolic expression of each region pointed to by p, we first obtain the corresponding value interval Domain; then, we assign a new value merged by all Domain to the abstract value of a. Finally, a new symbolic expression corresponding to the new value is generated. For a = p[iexp], if p points to an array or contiguous memory block dynamically allocated by malloc and O l [[r] ] is between 0 and the length of the base address region, the transfer operation will be allowed; otherwise the Out-of -Bounds warning may be prompted.
For the example in Figure 4 , before the execution of line 23, the pointer ptr may point to two memory objects x.result[0] and x.result [5] , so the model is expressed as <ptr, pm_7, ptr_4445, {<ubm_19, [0, 0]>, <ubm_20, [5, 5] >}>. Accordingly, the model representation of x.result is updated to <x.result, uam_18, {<0, ubm_19>, <5, ubm_20>}>. When line 22 is executed, the symbolic expressions x.result[0]_3637 and x.result [5] _4041 are first obtained by the region, and their current values are all [−inf , inf ]. Two [−inf , inf ] can still be merged to a new domain [−inf , inf ]; then, a new symbolic expression is generated and mapped to the new value. When line 24 is executed, the offset of the region {''ubm_20''} is [5, 5] , and [5, 5] Therefore, as shown in Table 2 and Table 4 , accessing sequential storage structures by pointers is closely related to bound security. Once operations exceed the lower or upper bounds, a warning is generated via the precalculation of the index; thus, our analysis can reduce unnecessary work and improve the accuracy and efficiency.
B. POINTER-RELATED PREDICATE OPERATION
If the predicate in a conditional expression looks like [[addrexp 1 addrexp 2 ]](where addrexp i is an address expression, and ∈{>, <, >=, <=, !=, == }), it also involves access operations of pointers.
If is >=, various address expressions in C programs can be classified into the following categories:
where p and q are pointers, iexp i is an integer expression, and a is a memory object.
We consider the following criteria when comparing address expressions:
• If addrexp 1 and addrexp 2 have the same base address and the relationship of the offset of addrexp 1 and the offset of addrexp 2 is , the predicate must be true;
• If addrexp 1 and addrexp 2 have the same base address and the relationship of the offset of addrexp 1 and the offset of addrexp 2 is not , the predicate must be false;
• Otherwise, the condition is true or false. When summarizing predicate operations for address expression comparisons, this paper uses flag to mark the boolean value of the predicate. Let True mean the predicate is true, False mean the predicate is false, and True or False mean that it is impossible to judge. Our work on predicate operations is shown in The above analysis of line 14 in Figure 4 indicates that because the right-end is the memory object buf [6] and the left-end is the memory object buf [6] , which have the same base address, the left-end offset interval [6, 6] and right-end offset interval [6, 6] satisfy the relation <=. Therefore the true branch of the if statement must be executed, and the points-to relationship of line and buf will change, resulting in some units of memory block without pointer pointing, which may cause memory leak.
C. INTER-PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS
Inter-procedural analysis plays an important role in data flow analysis. In recent years, researchers have conducted substantial work on inter-procedural pointer alias analysis, and we have previously proposed an inter-procedural analysis based on symbolic function summary [36] . However, few studies have focused on the parameters of the sequential storage structure type. The core work of inter-procedural analysis is mapping parameters to arguments. In this section, we introduce mapping rules for parameters of sequential storage structure type to corresponding arguments.
Let foPara be a pointer type parameter of a function fun, and let acPara be the corresponding argument that points to sequential storage structures when fun is called. foPara [iexp] represents an element of sequential storage structures referenced by foPara. 
As indicated by (1) and (2), the points-to regions, offsets and base address regions of foPara are the same as those of acPara. Figure 4 . The function ref is called at line 25 with the pointer ptr. For spc [2] in the function ref , after obtaining P l o [[spc]], the following steps are performed for each points-to region of spc:
• For a points-to region {''ubm_19''} with offset interval [0, 0], the corresponding region of spc [2] is {''ubm_23''}, and the offset interval and the memory object are [2, 2] and x.result [2] respectively.
• For another points-to region {''ubm_20''} with offset interval [5, 5] , the corresponding region of spc [2] is {''ubm_24''}, and the offset interval and the memory object are [7, 7] and x.result [7] respectively.
• Moreover, the values of x.result [2] and x.result [7] are modified to 31, and the model representation of x.result is updated.
V. MEMORY LEAK DETECTION ALGORITHM
Many information technologies, such as cloud computing [37] , artificial intelligence [38] , [39] , IoT [40] , edge computing [41] , [42] and service computing [43] - [45] , are widely applied. A variety of devices with different configurations and functions are used in the IoT, edge computing, and service computing environment, and memory leak is a common vulnerability in programs running on devices with limited computing and storage capacity. A memory leak usually does not present a directly observable error state but gradually accumulates, causing a waste of system memory, which may cause a software crash in severe cases. We focus on the following two categories of common memory leaks:
• Memory successfully allocated but not released: there is no corresponding free operation in the program for the allocated memory block or the memory block is not released in all possible execution paths, so the memory block cannot be correctly released.
• Allocation and release do not match: the size of the memory block released and the size of the allocated memory blocks do not match. As shown in the sample code in Figure 4 , after the assignment operation of buf at line 16, buf points to the 7th unit of the contiguous memory block. However, after the free(buf ) at line 18 is executed, a memory leak occurs, and the first seven units are not successfully released.
We proposes a memory leak detection algorithm to effectively detect the above types of memory leaks in C programs. Let MePtr l = {<Memory i , Pointer i >} at program point l, where Memory i is the region of contiguous memory block that is dynamically allocated or the region of a unit of contiguous memory block and Pointer i = {p 1 , · · · , p n } is the set of pointers pointing to Memory i . When memory leaks are detected, the pointer related to the dynamically allocated memory block on the node of the control flow graph is first identified, its storage state information is calculated according to the inductive transfer operations, and MePtr l is updated.
Our memory leak detection algorithm is as follows: For the program in Figure 6 , MePtr and mdb are null before executing line 2. At line 2, the SeqMM for text is represented as <text, pm_2, text_23, {<mbm_0_16, [0, 0]>}>, where ''mbm_0_16'' is the region number for the nameless memory block and MePtr is updated to {<mbm_0_16, text>}. At line 3, the model representations of a and b are <a, bm_3, a_45, [−inf , inf ]> and <b, bm_4, b_67, [−inf , inf ]>, respectively. We take [1, inf ] satisfying a>0 to execute the if statement block, and the Algorithm 1 Memory Leak Detection Algorithm Input:
The control flow graph G Output:
Defect inspection set mdb = {<line, variable, type>}. It includes the number of statement lines, pointers related to memory blocks, and the type of memory leaks. type = 0 means a memory block is not released in all possible execution paths; type = 1 means a memory blocks is not released completely. ASTtreenode.getScope(): obtain the set of variables in the corresponding scope on ASTtreenode. 1: let MePtr = ∅ 2: let pSet as the set of pointers related to memory blocks dynamically allocated 3: for each node in G do 4: if node is mallocNode then 5: add the corresponding region of memory blocks and pSet to MePtr 6: end if 7: if node is transferNode then 8: for each pointer p in node do 9: compute points-to information of p by transfer operation rules 10: update region and pSet in MePtr 11: for each r 1 in MePtr.getRegion() do 12: if MePtr.getPointer(r 1 ) == ∅ then 13: let r 2 as other regions in MePtr.getRegion() 14 :
MePtr.getPointer(r 2 ) == ∅ then 15: type = 0 16: add line, MePtr.getPointer(r 1 ) and type to mdb 17: MePtr.delete(r 1 ) 18: end if 19: end if 20: end for 21: end for 22: end if 23: if node is freeNode then 24: if P l [[p]]! = wild then 25: for r in P l [[p]] do 26: if O l [[r]]! = [0, 0] then 27: type = 1, and add line, p and type to mdb 28: else Algorithm 1 (Continued.) Memory Leak Detection Algorithm 29: MePtr.delete(r) 30: end if 31: end for 32: end if 33: end if 34: if node is exitNode then 35: let ASTtreenode = node.getTreeNode() 36: let scope = ASTtreenode.getScope() 37: for each r in MePtr.getRegion() do 38: for each p in MePtr.getPointer(r) do 39: if p in scope then 40: MePtr.delete(r, p) 41: end if 42: end for 43: end for 44: for r 1 in MePtr.getRegion() do 45: if end if 55: end for model of b is modified to <b, bm_4, 1>. Similarly, in the else statement block, the model of b is represented as <b, bm_4, 3>. Therefore, before executing the code at line 10, the value of b is [1, 1] [3, 3] . According to the value of b, text points to the first or third unit of the nameless memory block, and the model is expressed as <text, pm_5, text_1415, {<bm_6, [1, 1] >, <bm_7, [3, 3] >}>. MePtr is updated to {<mbm_0_16, {}>, <bm_6, text>, <bm_7, text>}. Therefore, after free(scalf ) is executed at line 11, the first unit of the dynamically allocated memory block is not released, leading to a memory leak. Then mdb is updated to {<11, text, 1>}, where ''1'' indicates that the nameless memory block is not completely released.
VI. THE EXPERIMENT
The experiment in this paper is based on the Defect Testing System for C(DTSC) defect detection system. DTSC is a static defect detection tool that identifies and derives possible defects by analyzing the source code of C programs. DTSC analyzes programs in four stages as shown in Figure 7 . In the process of defect detection by DTSC, the source files are transformed into abstract syntax tree, symbol table and control flow graph in turn, and the storage states of programs are analyzed by function call relationship analysis, def-use chains analysis and data flow analysis to detect defects. Finally the test results are recorded for statistical analysis. The SeqMM and Algorithm 1 proposed in this paper are implemented in the DTSC system to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
A. STATISTICS OF POINTER-RELATED OPERATIONS
The statistical results of the transfer and predicate operations for sequential storage structures in five open-source projects are shown in Table 6 . We arrange the transfer and predicate operations in the order in which they appear with a unique id, such as oper 1 for p = q + iexp and oper 11 for a = p[i].
As shown in Table 6 , transfer operations of pointers in C programs appear frequently. Transfer operations for pointer arithmetic are approximately 13/KLOC, and transfer operations for pointer dereference are approximately 16/KLOC. Among the transfer operations for pointer arithmetic, more than 51% are self-addition operations of pointers, and more than 42% are assignment operations between pointer variables and address expressions. Among the transfer operations for pointer references, the sequential storage structures is widely used in C programs by pointer dereference. Among them, elements of sequential storage structures referenced by index account for approximately about 59%. In addition, pointer-related predicate operations are rare in C programs.
In conclusion, sequential storage structures and their operations are widely used in C programs and must be analyzed to improve the accuracy of data flow analysis and defects detection.
B. MEMORY LEAK DETECTION OF 5 OPEN-SOURCE OBJECTS
In this section, DTSC_SeqMM, Klocwork12, and DTSC_RS TVL [5] are used to perform memory leak detection for 5 open-source projects to evaluate the advancement of DTSC_SeqMM. The experimental results are shown in Table 7 , which lists the analysis time of the tested items, the inspect points (IP, detected by tools and may be false positives) and real defects(RD, inspect points artificially judged as a defect) of different tools, relative false negatives(RFN), and the total number of memory leaks after artificial judgment.
The false positive rate(FPR) and false negative rate(FNR), which can be used to measure detection precision, are defined as follows (FD is the sum of the factual defects detected by the three tools):
After artificial judgment and comparative analysis of the test results, the memory leaks detected by DTSC_SeqMM include all the memory leaks detected by Klocwork12 and DTSC_RSTVL, which indicates that DTSC_SeqMM can reduce false negatives. The FPRs of DTSC_SeqMM, Klocwork12 and DTSC_RSTVL are 29.0%, 15.0% and 40.6%, respectively, and the FNRs are 0%, 22.7% and 13.6%. The comparison results show that DTSC_SeqMM achieves a zero NFR for memory leak detection. Because DTSC_SeqMM uses SeqMM to describe the storage state of variables, it can fully represent the dynamically allocated memory blocks that may cause memory leaks, and describe all kinds of operations involved, especially considering the numerical properties offset of the pointer, to ensure the adequacy of memory leak detection.
A real memory leak at line 323 in Figure 8 is detected by DTSC_SeqMM. aucBuffer points to a dynamically allocated memory block at line 301, and the memory block is released in the following if statement or for statement. If the conditions of the if statement and for statement are never satisfied, the memory block cannot be released, leading to a memory leak at line 323. Table 7 also shows that the analysis efficiency of DTSC_SeqMM is reduced compared with that of the other two detection tools because DTSC_SeqMM describes more data types and operations than do DTSC_RSTVL and Kloc-work12, and because MePtr l must be frequently queried and modified when detecting memory leaks.
C. MEMORY LEAK DETECTION OF IMPLANTED DEFECTS
To further evaluate the memory leak detection capability of the three tools, we implanted 50 examples of memory blocks allocated dynamically in actual IoT projects, where 40 examples contain the above memory leaks and 10 examples, numbered as c 1 , have no defects. For the 40 memory leaks, half are in the first category, numbered as c 2 , and the rest are in the second category numbered as c 3 . Table 8 shows the detection results of the above three tools.
The memory leak detection results of the three tools are shown in Table 8 . DTSC_SeqMM detected all 40 memory leaks, Klocwork12 detected only 29 memory leaks, and DTSC_RSTVL detected 34 memory leaks. Moreover, for the 10 examples with no defects, Klocwork12 and DTSC_RSTVL had 3 and 5 false positives, respectively, and DTSC_SeqMM had no false positives. The main reason is that DTSC_RSTVL and Klocwork12 lack an effective description of pointer offset, which leads to false negatives and false positives.
The example in Figure 9 is an implanted memory leak. DTSC_SeqMM can detect the memory leak caused by the release of scalef at line 9, whereas DTSC_RSTVL and Kloc-work12 fail to detect the leak. At line 3, the pointer ptr points to the array partial, and the offset interval is [0,0]. The pointer text points to partial [2] at line 4, and the offset interval is [2, 2] . Thus the base address region of the points-to region of ptr + 3 is the same as that of text, and the offset interval satisfies the relationship of >=; therefore, the program's self-addition operation on pointer scalef causes a deviation of one unit. When scalef is released at line 9, the memory block allocated successfully at line 5 is not completely released, leading to a memory leak.
Another example in Figure 10 is a false positive of Klock-work12 and DTSC_RSTVL. After the code at line 3 is executed, pointers aptr and cptr point to argv[0] and argv [2] , respectively. At line 4, aptr +2 and cptr have a common base address, and the offsets for their points-to regions satisfy the relationship ==; thus, free(argv) will be executed, leading to the memory block being released correctly.
In conclusion, the experimental results of this paper show that our data flow analysis method can effectively describe C programs with sequential storage structures, and the memory leak detection algorithm achieves accurate detection.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the abstract memory model SeqMM is proposed by studying the characterization of sequential storage structures, and the pointer-related transfer and predicate operations are summarized. The model effectively combines the points-to relationship with the numerical properties, and analyzes operations for accessing sequential storage structures, which solves the problem of existing data flow analysis methods of failing to analyze the sequential storage structures accurately. The above work is applied to memory leak detection, and the experimental results show that the proposed memory leak detection algorithm can detect memory leaks effectively with acceptable efficiency. However, our work does not consider the analysis of bitwise operations, which would lead to inaccurate analysis for programs with bitwise operations.
Future work will focus on reducing the FPR of memory leak detection and improving the analysis efficiency of DTSC_SeqMM.
